Postmodern Metamorphosis : Deformation, Performativity, Capitalism, and History, Part 2 by Ishiwari, Takayoshi
Osaka University
Title Postmodern Metamorphosis : Deformation, Performativity,Capitalism, and History, Part 2
Author(s)Ishiwari, Takayoshi
CitationOsaka Literary Review. 37 P.163-P.177
Issue Date1998-12-24
Text Versionpublisher
URL http://hdl.handle.net/11094/25373
DOI
Rights
      Postmodern Metamorphosis: 
      Deformation, Performativity, 
     Capitalism, and History, Part  2* 
                        Takayoshi Ishiwari
 The postmodern deformation of the subject hasmuch to do 
with what Oedipa describes as the "chances" of some other 
thing "happening" — this means, parenthetically, that it has 
also to do with what we may tentatively call a "cultural 
figure-ground reversal," which we will be discussing later  — 
and it has nothing to do with Jameson's "having to happen." 
Here we must have recourse to examples outside literature and 
practices in the field of photographic performance, mainly be-
cause of the need to demonstrate that this deformation (and 
the reversal) does happen there. Cindy Sherman, on the one 
hand, in her series of photographic self-portraits entitled 
Untitled Film Stills, repeatedly transforms herself in a charac-
teristically postmodern schizophrenic fashion into versions of, 
to borrow Arthur C. Danto's phrase, "The Girl" (10), by self-
consciously putting on those fetishized images of Hollywood 
and New Wave heroines which form an important part of our 
contemporary collective unconscious.' Jo Spence, on the other 
hand, in her self-portrait called Exiled exposes her own aging, 
ugly body, including its disfigured breast because of lumpec-
tomy, with a text "MONSTER" inscribed upon it, in an at-
tempt to reappropriate and reclaim that body which has 
become an object of the male-dominant medical discourse. 
 It is here that the link between performance and the type of 
utterance which J. L. Austin has defined as the performative 
ceases to be a mere pun or a not-so interesting example of
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metonymic contiguity; and it is also here that the relationship 
between the postmodern deformation of the subject and the 
performative becomes manifest. Indeed, what makes Sherman's 
and Spence's self-portraits "performances" should be located in 
the fact that they are implicit performatives or photographic 
equivalents for the explicit performatives, "I name myself The 
Girl," in Sherman's case, and "I hereby declare myself a mon-
ster," in Spence's. Moreover, it should not go unremarked either 
that the aesthetic force of their nonverbal acts of naming and 
declaring derives less from their originality than from their para-
sitism; their performative "utterances" are repetitions and cita-
tions, made possible by their artistic medium, the camera, of the 
verbally self-effacing patriarchal imperatives/interpellations  — 
"Hey
, you there! I name you The Girl" and "Yes, you! I hereby 
declare you monstrous" (it is these "performative interpellations" 
that link Austin with Althusser) — that they keep encounter-
ing in the world as a normal course of events. 
 On the most basic level, it seems self-evident that their acts 
of self-consciously repeating the very patriarchal mechanism of 
interpellating and naming, as well as the resultant self-
confinement in what Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Guber 
called the ineluctable  "angel  /  monster double bind" (36), are 
morbidly self-destructive, since they are subversive of their 
own identities as real individuals; Sherman and Spence seem 
deeply intent on repudiating and disowning their own "social 
character," to return to Marx, and perpetuating their primary 
status as male images through these self-disruptive perform-
ances. Nevertheless, their apparent skepticism toward the pos-
sibility of escape, their self-imprisonment not only in the 
stereotypical images of femininity but also in such a dark 
chamber as the camera obscura, or what amounts to the same 
thing, their "claustrophilic" art of what we may call "triple
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binding" — all these paradoxical and suicidal features seem in-
dicative of something positive in them, which, I would say, is 
their necromantic desire to speak to their own already dead 
selves. This addressing is accomplished in their photographs; 
but the point is that this accomplishment is achieved by mak-
ing an impossible attempt — a redundant and therefore exces-
sive essay — to put to death once again the already dead 
individuals, namely, themselves, in the totality of their photo-
graphic performances. And importantly, this essay, a grotesque 
inversion of the rhetorical figure of prosopopoeia, is at the 
same time an attempt to repeat and restage the process of 
subject-formation — or more succinctly, to "re-form" them-
selves. 
 But their photographic performances have even graver impli-
cations, and they are closely related, to use the word with 
which Foucault concluded "What Is an  Author?  " to the "indif-
ference" (138) to the gender differentiation and the space 
where that indifference can happen, as well as to the link be-
tween repetition — or the "general iterability," as Derrida puts it 
(325) — and  alterity? On the one hand, their restaging or cita-
tion requires them to speak the very patriarchal language of 
the male interpellant; this means that in the process they be-
come the represented object and the representing agent simul-
taneously, and hence both female and male at once. In this 
respect, their photographic performance is not so much femi-
nist as postfeminist in that it produces, by virtue of their mastery 
over repetition, androgynous individuals who embrace internal 
conflict, not neutral androgynes like those Virginia Woolf envi-
sioned. Moreover, if the medium at issue, the camera, is basically 
a technological and therefore phallic extension to the male body, 
their reappropriation of it necessarily makes them self-warring 
hermaphrodites. Thus their photographic performances, or more
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precisely, what Austin would have called their "primary" utter-
ances (69), are also reducible to another explicit performative, 
"I declare myself a man
," which in effect constitutes a scandal-
ous declaration of a difference — women simulating men — and 
an indifference: "What difference does it make which gender I 
belong to?  "3 It is because this declaration gives birth to an 
event and an accident — such elusive, anomalous, and 
"agendered" subjects as their deformed figures — that the 
postfeminism of Sherman and Spence must be designated post-
modern; and it is also postmodern because in that process it 
provokes a question (mark):  "Is it really happening? "4 
 On the other hand, if we turn our attention to the conditions 
for the "happiness" or felicity of this declaration, we immedi-
ately find that what Sherman and Spence in reality do with 
their photographic images is not only to give birth to these 
malformed subjects but, true to Derrida again, to engender or 
make happen a new space or context — photographic self-
portrait, or performance art — in which these mutations, errors, 
and indifferent beings are permitted to  exist.' What is particu-
larly relevant here is Austin's conception of "appropriate cir-
cumstances" in which saying something counts as doing 
something. (Indeed, a general shift of focus is required in the 
field of theory and criticism, I would insist, so that more im-
portance is given not to the performative utterance proper but 
rather to its relationship with its immediate context.) Austin 
says: 
   Speaking generally, it is always necessary that the circum-
   stances in which the words are uttered should be in some 
   way, or ways, appropriate, and it is very commonly neces-
   sary that either the speaker himself or other persons 
   should also perform certain other actions, whether "physi-
   cal" or "mental" actions or even acts of uttering further
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   words. Thus, for naming the ship, it is essential that I 
   should be the person appointed to name her, for
   (Christian) marrying, it is essential that I should not be al-
   ready married with a wife living, sane and undivorced, 
   and so on: for a bet to have been made, it is generally nec-
   essary for the offer of the bet to have been accepted by a 
   taker (who must have done something, such as to say
   "Done")
, and it is hardly a gift if I say "I give it you" but 
   never hand it over. (8-9) 
All we need to do is reverse this formulation and say: if an 
unprecedented performative, which is therefore most likely to 
be considered accidental and even erroneous, has somehow 
been uttered successfully or "happily," this necessarily means 
that we must suppose the existence of an accompanying set of 
new appropriate circumstances, a new context, a new conven-
tion — but at the same time a new ideology even — totally 
other than any preexisting total context. It follows that this 
new space — a postmodern space which abounds with its own 
"native" postmodern deformed subjects — appears to the inhabi-
tants of the older ones as a totally different and indifferent, 
hence absurdly ec-centric, space which threatens to undermine 
the valuable "-centrisms" that their already established rules 
are meant to reinforce. It is precisely in this way that Sherman 
and Spence effect a cultural figure-ground reversal, reducing 
the formerly spotlighted "figure-world" to a mere foil. 
 A postmodern metamorphosis as it relates to the deforma-
tion of the subject happens, therefore, when an already "dead" 
individual subject essays to repeat the very ideological process 
of subject-formation in order to refashion or "re-form" him- or 
herself and thereby accidentally though self-consciously give 
birth to both an erroneous event-subject and a new space in 
which it can happen. 
 To return to Oedipa and her sense of history, it is precisely
           Postmodern Metamorphosis: Deformation, Performativity, 168
Capitalism, and History, Part 2 
what she describes as the "chances" of something other "hap-
pening" itself that exemplifies the historicity of this  postmod-
ern subject-deformation. But if we duly underscore the terms 
"chances" and "happening" in her remark
, not the "other," then 
we find that this historicity is not only what one can depend 
on when he or she sets out to remake his or her body, but 
also what one was born with. Hence the following conversa-
tion with Sherman: 
   NF [Noriko Fuku, the  interviewer]: In an interview from 
   around 1985, you said, "If I had not been born at this time 
   and place, I would not have been able to use this form of 
   expression, and if I had been a man I could not have cre-
   ated work based on my own experience in this way." 
   Could you tell us more about "this time and place," and 
   why being a woman enables you to create this work? 
   CS: I was referring to being aware of everything going on 
   in the media, which is really what has most influenced the 
   work. If I'd been raised in Africa, I would have had a to-
   tally different set of cultural stimuli. And some people say 
   my art is very American — although the Film Stills, I 
   think, are influenced more by European films than 
   American films. 
     Even though I've never actively thought of my work as 
   feminist or as a political statement, certainly everything in 
   it was drawn from my observations as a woman in this 
   culture. And a part of that is a love-hate thing — being in-
   fatuated with make-up and glamour and detesting it at the 
   same time. It comes from trying to look like a proper 
   young lady or look as sexy or as beautiful as you can 
   make yourself, and also feeling like a prisoner of that 
   structure. That's certainly something I don't think men 
   would relate to. (Sherman 163) 
 "How  • has it ever happened, this American woman, this  'me,' 
with the chances once so good of my becoming, say, an
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African woman, an African man, or an American  man?  " It is 
this almost Nietzschean sense of contingency and 
groundlessness in the face of the singularity of one's existence 
—  "  I happen to be the way I am" — that at the deepest level 
makes Sherman's art what it is. But this singularity is by no 
means mysterious nor even religious but rather discouragingly 
ideological, and it is again Althusser and especially his notion 
of interpellation that is extremely pertinent here: since every 
interpellation is an asymmetric or "one-way" process, an en-
counter with it always-already appears to the interpellated 
subject as a coincidence, a contingency, an  "event." It is this 
primary historicity of ideological interpellation that is prior to 
and makes possible the simulated historicity of the postmodern 
deformation (note that this observation does not contradict 
Althusser's proposition that "ideology has no history"  [159]  ); 
indeed, our second type of metamorphosis is not only an at-
tempt to create contingencies but also to reactivate one's in-
nate contingencies — it is a self-conscious attempt to 
approximate a contingency. 
 I can give two literary examples of this second metamorpho-
sis, which have not usually been explicitly associated either 
with deformation or with postmodernism. The first one is 
those nineteenth-century women writers who, to borrow 
Gilbert and Guber's key phrase, "attempted the pen." 
Genealogically speaking, this "attempt" is not only feminist but 
also postfeminist and, above all, markedly postmodern, since, if 
the "pen" is a masculine technology and above all a "meta-
phorical penis" as they argue (Gilbert and Guber 3), then their 
"attempt" in effect constitutes a literary equivalent for the ex-
plicit performative, "I declare myself a man," just as Sherman's 
and Spence's performances are photographic equivalents for 
the same utterance. Hence swarms of hermaphroditic subjects,
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"freaks
," "monsters." In retrospect, therefore, the alternative fe-
male tradition Gilbert and Guber and other feminists like 
Elaine Showalter have excavated — "a literature and a culture 
of their own," as they say (xii) — cannot be anything but a 
postmodern eccentric space. 
 By the same token, a rethinking of Chinua Achebe's 
postcolonial reading of Joseph Conrad's Heart of Darkness 
seems urgently required so that we can deal more adequately 
with the novella's postmodernity. According to Achebe, what 
worries Conrad is "not the differentness [between the River 
Congo and the Thames, which are metonyms for Africans and 
Europeans respectively]  .  .  . but the lurking hint of kinship, of 
common ancestry" (263); thus he insists that Conrad's racist at-
titude is most pronounced in the passage, "what thrilled you 
was just the thought of their humanity — like yours — the 
thought of your remote kinship with this wild and passionate 
uproar. Ugly" (Achebe 264; Conrad 69). From our perspective, 
however, it is precisely this "ugliness" that makes these "pre-
historic" black men — who appear to be saying, despite their 
"bestiality" and deformity
, "We declare ourselves human be-
ings, your  'kith and  kin,— but at the same time also appear to 
be defiantly talking back, "What difference does it make 
whether we are men or  beasts?  " — paradigmatic "postmodern" 
subjects living in another genuine postmodern space, the Dark 
 Continent.' 
 I hasten to add, however, that this postcolonial example may 
be seriously misleading if we are not careful about the link 
between the postmodern deformation and self-consciousness. 
For the postmodern self-deforming subject's essay to remake its 
own body, or its endeavor to approximate a contingency, can 
only be a self-conscious attempt; this is exactly the reason that 
both Lyotard and Foucault associate postmodernism/modernity
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with art. It is this self-consciousness, however, that is entirely 
absent from Conrad's Africans. To put this another way, they 
lack agency, which I define as the individual subject's capacity 
for such a self-conscious attempt to deform oneself, an attempt 
that often takes the form of an oxymoron, a paranoid attempt 
to transform oneself into a  schizophrenic.' Moreover, as long as 
our notion of human agency embraces forms of schizophrenia, 
the personality or "identity" of such a subject is necessarily 
discontinuous and  fragmentary.' In light of all this, the post-
modern  self-deforming subject emerges primarily as an agent, 
or better still, a critic who, knowing that his or her identity is 
always-already ideologically constructed, uses his or her own 
local identity crisis as a material means of bringing social sys-
tem as a whole to a crisis. 
 But ironically, this critical moment that does evidence the 
actuality of resistance coincides with Jameson's "moment of 
truth" of postmodernism, since the self-deformed subject thus 
given birth to is so easily co-opted by capitalism, "re-formed" 
as a capitalist subject, and falls prey to its dynamic rhythm of 
commodity production. Or if this is not the case, then it is 
only that its salto mortale just proves fatal, contributing only 
toward making it excluded, invisible, hence nonexistent. It is 
exactly this latter group of unsuccessful leapers that Deleuze 
and Guattari wanted to foreground when they introduced the 
notion of "sick schizos," those "mad" subjects rescued, however, 
at least from oblivion: 
   Our society produces schizos the same way it produces 
 Prell shampoo or Ford cars, the only difference being that 
   the schizos are not salable. How then does one explain the 
   fact that capitalist production is constantly arresting the 
   schizophrenic process and transforming the subject of the 
   process into a confined clinical entity, as though it saw in
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   this process the image of its own death coming from 
   within? Why does it make the schizophrenic into a sick 
   person — not only nominally but in reality? Why does it 
   confine its madmen and madwomen instead of seeing in
   them its own heros  [sic] and heroines, its own fulfillment? 
   And where it can no longer recognize the figure of a  sim-
   ple illness, why does it keep its artists and even its scien-
   tists under such close surveillance — as though they risked 
   unleashing flows that would be dangerous for capitalist 
   production and charged with a revolutionary potential, so 
   long as these flows are not co-opted or absorbed by the 
   laws of the market? Why does it form in turn a gigantic 
   machine for social repression-psychic repression, aimed at 
   what nevertheless constitutes its own reality — the de-
   coded flows? (Deleuze and Guattari 245) 
But Deleuze and Guattari's powerful articulation to the con-
trary, we are quite familiar with "salable" schizophrenics, the 
examples being Sherman and Spence. Indeed, it is only after, 
first, the institutional process of definition —  Althusser's cul-
tural ISA includes "the Arts"  (Althusser 143) — and the capi-
talist processes of "re-formation" and the extraction of surplus 
value are completed, and then their hard-won "eventness" is 
thus dealt with and they themselves are turned into "fashiona-
bly sick schizos," that is, it is only post festum, that the other-
wise perpetually nameless postmodern space they have 
engendered — "photographic self-portrait," "performance art"  — 
comes to be known as such. And significantly, this co-optative 
process of institutionalization or, to borrow again the phrase 
Achebe employed in characterizing Conrad's racist attitude, of 
"keeping something in place" (Achebe 264)
, is marked not by 
direct confinement but by its generosity. Hence the appropri-
ateness of Deleuze and Guattari's idiosyncratic use of spatial 
terms "deterritorialization" and "reterritorialization" in describ-
ing not the "coding" but the "axiomatizing" function of money.
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It is the totalizing power of this capitalist process of co-
optation, which makes even such critically  self-deforming 
agents as Sherman and Spence formally indistinguishable from 
commodities like  "Pre11 shampoo" and "Ford cars," that finally 
enables us to realize the full implications of Marx's salto 
mortale. Indeed, what Marx referred to was the fatal leap of 
the commodity itself, when it is involved in its first metamor-
phosis or sale. Accordingly, in capitalism this leap proves dou-
bly fatal: if it is fatal in Marx's sense, the "former commodity-
to-be," to appropriate Althusser's way of designating the 
unborn child, can never become a commodity, can never be 
born and visible in the first place, and therefore can never find 
its place in a capitalist system (though it can become irrecov-
erably "sick"); but if its leap is successful, this only means that 
it has undergone the leveling process of commodification, 
which constitutes the capitalist counterpart to the ideological 
process of subject-formation. It follows that if social reality, in-
cluding postmodern  self-refashioning agents, is totally 
commodified, what awaits them cannot be anything but either 
co-optation or nonexistence — that is, what awaits them is ei-
ther death or death. 
  I would argue that, if the moment of truth of postmodernism 
comes in the form of this inability to escape from the capital-
ist double bind, the key to surviving it can be found in a tem-
porality totally other than the schizophrenic's "perpetual 
present" that Jameson deems the authentic postmodern mode 
of relating to time ("Postmodernism and Consumer Society" 
119), a temporality that is still less compatible with Deleuze 
and Guattari's spatial approach to the logic of late capitalism. 
This alternative temporality is the paranoid's durability  — 
paranoia, unlike schizophrenia, is not characterized by break-
downs — and it is his or her excessive, and almost solipsistic,
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self-consciousness indispensable to this durability that enables 
the already (re-)formed agent to deform him- or herself over 
and again, that is, to metamorphose into another new form ad 
infinitum. We must count this duration as one of the defining 
features of the agency of the postmodern  self-deforming sub-
ject. Furthermore, we must add that this agency is inseparable 
from the Kantian theme of the sublime: the masochistic senti-
ment in which pleasure derives from pain, which, in other 
words, is a contradictory sentiment caused by the conflict be-
tween one's faculty to conceive of something and his or her 
faculty to present that  something.' For on the one hand, the 
self-disfiguring paranoid, by virtue of his or her chronic capa-
bility for metamorphosis, inevitably appears to others as a sort 
of plastic subject whose impending another transformation is 
expected, the exact form of which, however, is both 
unpresentable and unpredictable (since it has all the character-
istics of an accident). On the other hand, his or her sentiment 
embraces neither disconnection nor discontinuity but a contra-
dictory combination of pleasure and pain: the pain that his or 
her attempt to criticize society should be made at the cost of 
his or her identity, but the pleasure that it is this very pain 
that should give him or her the power to critique. This post-
modern sublime subject, accordingly, has no alternative but to 
become an ascetic who substitutes agency for the pleasure of 
an identity. 
 *This is a sequel to my essay
, "Postmodern Metamorphosis: 
 Deformation, Performativity, Capitalism, and History," in Essays 
 Presented to Professor Haruhiko Fujii on the Occasion of His 
 Retirement from Osaka University (forthcoming).
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                           Notes 
1. Her  self-deforming tendencies are becoming increasingly explicit as her ca-
   reer progresses, and they are especially pronounced in Disasters, Fairy 
   Tales, Civil War, and Sex Pictures. (I am indebted to the critic Rosalind 
   Krauss for these titles and the grouping of her works. See Krauss, Cindy 
   Sherman 1975-1993.) 
2. Drawing in his characteristic fashion on etymology, Derrida observes that 
   "iter
, once again, comes from itara, other in Sanskrit" (315). 
3. This declaration also raises the problem of the "rhetorical question." On its 
   close connection with deconstruction, see Paul de Man, Allegories of 
   Reading (9-12). Suffice it to say here that their rhetorical question engen-
   ders the following tension between its literal and figurative meanings, 
   hence an indifference: while the male interlocutor, taking it literally, is 
   urged to reply, "It makes all the difference," they have the power to dodge 
   and say, "I just meant it figuratively — that is, I don't give a damn what 
   the difference is." 
4. "The event happens as a question mark  'before' happening as a question," 
   Lyotard writes in "The Sublime and the Avant-Garde." He goes on to sug-
   gest that "It happens is rather 'in the first place' is it happening, is this it, 
   is it possible?" (197). 
5. On the production of new contexts, see Derrida (320). 
6. On the link between bestiality and the "cyborg," see Haraway (152). Also 
   note Deleuze and Guattari's attribution of revolutionary potential to both 
   bestiality and negritude; quoting Rimbaud, they say: "No, I am not of your 
   kind, I am the outsider and the deterritorialized, 'I am of a race inferior 
   for all eternity.... I am a beast, a  Negro— (105). 
7. My formulation of "agency" must be distinguished, therefore, from Paul 
   Smith's definition of the "human agent" in which self-consciousnessplays 
   no part. See Smith (xxxv). 
8. I insist on this point despite feminists like Nancy Miller, who once urged 
   us to forget Barthes in order to save identity: "So why remember Barthes, 
   if this model of reading and writing by definition excludes the question of 
   an identity crucial to feminist critical  theory?  " (22). 
9. But Lyotard does not forget to point out that  "  W  here is something of the 
   sublime in capitalist economy" ("The Sublime and the Avant-Garde" 209). 
   On the relationship between the sublime and masochism, see Lyotard, 
   "Answering" (77)
, and Nick Mansfield, Masochism: The Art of Power (23-32).
           Postmodern Metamorphosis: Deformation, Performativity, 176
Capitalism, and History, Part 2 
                      Works Cited 
Achebe, Chinua. "An Image of Africa: Racism in Conrad's Heart of Darkness." 
   A Practical Reader in Contemporary Literary Theory. Ed. Peter Brooker and 
   Peter Widdowson. London: Prentice Hall, 1996. 261-71. 
Althusser, Louis. "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards 
   an Investigation)." Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays. Trans. Ben 
   Brewster. New York: Monthly Review, 1971. 127-86. 
Austin, J. L. How to Do Things with Words. Ed. J.  0. Urmson and Marina 
 Sbisa. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1975. 
Conrad, Joseph. Heart of Darkness. 1902. Ed. and introd. Paul O'Prey. 
   Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1989. 
Danto, Arthur C. "Photography and Performance: Cindy Sherman's Stills." 
   Untitled Film Stills. By Cindy Sherman. London: Jonathan Cape, 1990.5-14. 
Deleuze, Gilles, and Felix Guattari. Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. 
   1977. Trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane. Minneapolis: 
   U of Minnesota P, 1983. 
de Man, Paul. Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, 
   Rilke, and Proust. New Haven: Yale UP, 1979. 
Derrida, Jacques. "Signature Event  Context." Margins of Philosophy. Trans. Alan 
   Bass. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1982. 307-30. 
Foucault, Michel. "What Is an Author?" Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: 
   Selected Essays and Interviews. Trans. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry 
   Simon. Ed. Donald F. Bouchard. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1977. 113-38. 
Gilbert, Sandra M., and Susan Guber. The Madwoman in the Attic: The Woman 
   Writer and the Nineteenth-Century Literary Imagination. New Haven: Yale 
   UP, 1979. 
Haraway, Donna J. "A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-
   Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century." Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: 
   The Reinvension of Nature. New York: Routledge, 1991. 149-81. 
Jameson, Fredric. Foreword. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. 
   By Jean-Francois Lyotard. Trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi. 
   Theory and History of Lit. 10. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota  P, 1984. vii-
    xxi.  
. "Periodising the Sixties."  Postmodernism: A Reader. Ed. Patricia Waugh. 
   London: Edward Arnold, 1992. 125-52.  
. "Postmodernism and Consumer Society." The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on
             Takayoshi Ishiwari 177 
   Postmodern Culture. Ed. Hal Foster. Seattle: Bay, 1983. 111-25. 
 Kr'auss, Rosalind. Cindy Sherman 1975-1993. New York: Rizzoli, 1993. 
Lyotard, Jean-Francois. "Answering the Question: What Is Postmodernism?" 
   Trans. Regis Durand. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. 
   Trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi. Theory and History of Lit. 
   10. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1984. 71-82.  
. "The Sublime and the Avant-Garde." Trans. Lisa Liebmann, Geoff 
   Bennington, and Marian Hobson. The Lyotard Reader. Ed. Andrew 
   Benjamin. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989. 196-211. 
Mansfield, Nick. Masochism: The Art of Power. Westport: Praeger-Greenwood, 
   1997. 
Marx, Karl. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. 1887. Trans. Samuel Moore 
   and Edward Aveling. Ed. Frederick Engels. Vol. 1. New York: 
   International, 1996. 
Miller, Nancy. "Changing the Subject: Authorship, Writing and the Reader." 
   What Is an Author? Ed. Maurice Biriotti and Nicola Miller. Manchester: 
   Manchester UP, 1993. 19-41. 
Pynchon, Thomas. The Crying of Lot 49. 1966. New York: Perennial-Harper,. 
   1986. 
Sherman, Cindy. "Interview with Cindy Sherman." Cindy Sherman. Ed. Sachiko 
   Osaki et al. Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun, 1996. 161-66. 
Smith, Paul. Discerning the Subject. Theory and History of Lit. 55. Minneapolis: 
   U of Minnesota  P, 1988.
